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1 Introduction
In the traditional theory of successive markets, the property of double marginalization has attracted
the interest of scholars since its very discovery by Spengler in 1950. This property says that, when
the supply chain is monopolized in each of the successive markets, the price of the nal product
embodies the monopoly unit margins arising in each of them. This theory is cast assuming that rms,
while behaving as monopolists in their own output market, behave as price takers when buying their
input. This assumption implies a specic sequentiality in the rmsdecisions: in the second stage, the
downstream monopolist selects the output level, conditional on the input price. This choice generates
a demand function for the input. The e¤ective input price then obtains in the rst stage from the
equality between the downstream monopolists demand and the upstream monopolists input supply
decision. Supply decisions are assumed to maximize the upstream monopolists prot on the demand
function of the downstream monopolist. This constitutes the traditional approach to analyze the
property of double marginalization in the bilateral monopoly framework.
This approach has also been adopted by Salinger (1988), Gaudet and Van Long (1996) and Gab-
szewicz and Zanaj (2011) among others, in their endeavor to analyze this property in the more general
framework of successive oligopolies. Downstream and upstream rms select non cooperatively à la
Cournot the quantities of output of the good they produce, the output of the upstream rms serving
as input for the downstream ones in the production of their own output. Downstream rms engage
in an oligopoly in the downstream market but they take the input price as given and xed by the
upstream rms.
Whether downstream rms have market power in their input market is not always easy to establish.
In fact, the number of downstream rms in a specic output market and using a specic input is not
necessarily related to the number of rms operating in the market for this input. A monopolist in some
downstream market can coast along a large number of other rms in its input market simply because
many small rms in other industries use the same input in their production process. Then, regardless
of the market power the monopolist owns in its output market, the assumption of price taking behavior
in the input market is natural because the output monopolist cannot inuence alone the price of the
input. For instance, a monopoly rm uses wheat to produce only biofuel, while many other rms use
wheat to produce bread. By contrast, when downstream rms are few in number and are the only
candidates to buy some input, it is reasonable to assume that they can inuence the price of their
inputs. Examples abound: microsoft with respect to the software industry, American Telephone and
Telegraph, U.S. Steel company, railways with respect to wagon producers, car producers with respect
to tyre producers. Thus, the assumption of price-taking behavior in the input market can be valid in
some industries while completely unsatisfactory in others.
For this reason, the classical approach well ts in some industries but cannot be used in others.
In many sectors, the price of input is clearly a¤ected by the exercise of market power of both sellers
-upstream rms- and buyers -downstream rms. The existing literature on successive oligopolies lacks
a framework that can tackle such market congurations. In this paper we aim at lling this gap.
To do so we introduce an alternative approach to examine how successive oligopolies do operate
between downstream and upstream markets, when downstream rms cannot be assumed price takers
in the input market. The alternative approach, proposed in this paper, relies on the notion of strategic
market game, which constitutes the most natural framework to use when prices are formed by the
simultaneous actions of all agents. The basic version of a strategic market game that we consider
is the one introduced by Shapley and Shubik (Shapley, 1976, and Shapley and Shubik, 1977), used
also by Gabszewicz and Michel (1997) and recently by Amir and Bloch (2009). Within the successive
oligopolies, a market game approach proposes the following timing of rmsdecisions. In the second
stage, the n downstream oligopolists play a Cournot game in the downstream market, and bid each
a quantity of money he/she is willing to o¤er to get a share of the total input supplied by the m
upstream rms in the rst stage. This choice generates an amount of money to be shared among
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the upstream oligopolists in proportion to their input production. In the rst stage, the upstream
oligopolists choose non cooperatively the amount of input they supply, in order to maximize the
amount of money obtained from their input sales. The two approaches essentially di¤er by the fact
that in the price-taking scenario the input price obtains from the market clearing condition while in
the market game scenario, the input price, expressed in monetary units, is equal to the ratio between
the total amount of bids o¤ered by the downstream rms, and the total amount of input supplied by
the upstream ones.
As discovered below, introducing market games leads to di¤erent market outcomes than those
observed in the traditional approach where successive oligopolies operate through the usual price-
taking mechanism. Consequently, it naturally invites to contrast the di¤erences between the scenario
resulting from the just described approach - market game scenario - and the traditional theory of
successive markets, which we call price-taking scenario. In particular, it invites to compare output
prices to consumers with the input prices to downstream rms, the extent of double marginalization
and the consequences on welfare.
To decide whether the market game scenario or the price-taking scenario is the most appropriate,
one needs to fully understand the input price mechanism that takes place in di¤erent industries. The
price-taking scenario, introduced by Spengler (1950), benets from its repeated use in the analysis
of vertical collusive agreements (see, for instance, Salinger (1988) and Gaudet and Van Long (1996),
Ordover et al (1990), or in Gabszewicz and Zanaj (2011). The market game approach o¤ers the ad-
vantage of discarding the awkward assumption, implicit in the traditional analysis, that an auctioneer
has to choose the upstream market clearing price. In both cases, a sequentiality is introduced in the
decisions of the oligopolists. In the price-taking scenario, upstream oligopolists play the rst, using
for evaluating their payo¤ the input price resulting from the equality of their total supply with the
input demands of the downstream oligopolists. In the market game scenario, upstream oligopolists
are also the rst to play, but now they use the bids selected by the downstream rms in the second
stage game for guiding their decisions.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, the model is developed. Section 3 is dedicated
to the exploration of the equilibrium with market games and the equilibrium obtained within the
classical scenario. Section 4 develops the comparisons between the market outcomes. Finally, Section
5 concludes.
2 The model
Consider an economy consisting in two successive markets. In the downstream market there are n
downstream rms indexed by i; i = 1; :::n; producing the nal good, and in the upstream market there
are m upstream rms indexed by j, j = 1; :::m; producing the corresponding input good. Assume that
the n downstream rms face a demand function p(Q), with Q denoting aggregate output: Downstream
rm i owns technology fi(z) to produce the output, with z denoting the quantity of the sole input
used in the production process. The m upstream rms each produce the input z at a total cost
Cj(z); j = 1; ::;m: Similarly to the existing literature, we assume that output and input prices are
determined in a two-stage sequential game.
We depart from the previous literature in the way the input price is determined. We introduce
strategic market games to allow donwstream rms to a¤ect the input price. Hence, as far as the input
price is concerned, the input market looks like an exchange economy involving two types of traders and
two goods. Commodities are the input and money. The agents bidding money to buy the input are the
downstream rms that own prots (money) obtained from selling the output good to nal consumers.
Agents who o¤er the input for sale are the upstream rms that can produce (or are endowed) with
the input good. Thus the initial ownership of the input good is concentrated in the hands of the m
upstream rms while money is initially owned by the downstream ones under the form of their prots.
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The input market thus appears as a bilateral oligopoly in the sense used by Bloch and Ferrer (2001),
or Gabszewicz and Cordella (1998)
More specically, sellers (upstream rms) have input supply strategies denoted by sj . When the
cost to produce the input Cj(z) is zero, these amounts can be seen as an endowment of each player
j; as in the original version of Shapley-Shubik games. Upstream rms aim at maximizing the amount
of money they obtain from their input sales. Buyers play a Cournot game in the downstream market
and they participate in the strategic game with money bidding strategies bi. They aim at maximizing
their prot in the downstream market by obtaining through their bids the quantity of input required
to produce their Cournot equilibrium quantities. These downstream rms can obtain the money
necessary for paying their bids to the inputs sellers by borrowing from the banking system, using
as collateral the prot obtained by selling the output good. Hence, the trade mechanism in the
successive markets setup allows an allocation of the input good among downstream rms in a way
that nk=1bk = 
m
h=1sh: As standard in strategic market games, the price of the traded good is given
by the ratio of the total amounts of bids over the the total of o¤ers : 
n
k=1bk
mh=1sh
; which can be seen as an
average market clearing input price.
The downstream and the upstream markets are linked to each other via the production function
fi; namely,
fi(zi) = fi(
biS
nk=1bk
);
where biSnk=1bk
constitutes the fraction of total input supply S obtained by rm i through its bidding
strategy bi:
Given a total input supply S; the payo¤ in the second stage game for the ith rm at the vector of
strategies (bi; b i) obtains as
i(bi; b i;S) = p

fi(
biS
nh=1bh
) + k 6=ifk(
bkS
nh=1bh
)

fi(
biS
nh=1bh
)  bi:
Given these payo¤s, and a total supply S in the input market, the best reply, bi(b i(S)) of rm i in
the second stage game obtains as a solution (whenever it exists) to the problem
Max
bi
i(bi; b i;S):
A Nash equilibrium in the second stage game, conditional on a total input supply S; is a vector of
strategies (b1(S); :::; bn(S)) such that, for all i; bi (S) = bi(b

 i(S)):
In the rst stage game, upstream rms select their supply strategies sj ; j = 1; ::;m: Given a n-tuple
of supply strategies (s1;:::; sj ; ::; sm) and a vector of downstream rmsbids (b1; :::; bn) in the second
stage game, the amount of money received by rm j obtains as
 j(sj ; s j) =
nk=1bk
mh=1sh
sj   Cj(sj);
which constitutes the payo¤ function of the jth-upstream rm in the rst stage game, conditional on
the vector of bids (b1; :::; bn) chosen by the downstream rms in the second stage.
Hence, (whenever it exists) a strategic equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium is the (n + m) tuple of
strategies (b1; :::; bn; s1;:::; sm) 8i8j such that 8bi and 8bj
i(b

i ; s

j )  i(bi; sj)
 j(b

i ; s

j )   j(bi; sj):
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3 Exploring subgame perfect equilibria
To isolate the di¤erence between the market outcome with the price-taking scenario and the market
outcome corresponding to the market game scenario, we stick to the assumptions made in the classical
approach. Namely, we assume (i) a linear output technology and a linear demand function in the
downstream market, as in Salinger (1988), Gaudet and Van Long (1996) and Gabszewicz and Zanaj
(2010) and (ii) that rms operating in the upstream (resp. downstream) market are all identical. Entry
and competition are analyzed through the asymptotic properties of the subgame-perfect equilibrium
when the number of rms in the markets is increased by expanding the economy, as in Debreu and
Scarf (1963).
3.1 Market Game scenario
Hence, assume that downstream rms face a linear demand p(Q) = 1 Q and use a constant returns
technology to produce the output:
f(z) = z; 1 >  > 01.
The prots i(bi; b i;S) of the ith downstream rm at the vector of strategies (bi; b i) and S now
obtains as
i(bi; b i;S) = (1   bi
bi +B0
S   
X
k 6=i
bk
bi +B0
S)
biS
bi +B0
  bi
with B0 =
P
h 6=i bh.
Solving the maximization problem of a downstream rm and using symmetry, we get at equilibrium
b(S) =
S (1  S) (n  1)
n2
Hence, the payo¤ j of an upstream rm at the rst stage of the game, after substituting for b;obtains
as
 j(s;s j) =
(1  (sj + S0)) (n  1) (sj + S0)
(sj + S0)
sj   sj :
Maximizing  j(s;s j); yields at the symmetric equilibrium
s(n;m) =
(n    n)
2 (n  1) (m+ 1) : (1)
Hence the optimal quantity of money b(S) and the corresponding output quantities of each down-
stream are
b(n;m) =
(  n  mn) (  n+ n)m
2n2 (n  1) (m+ 1)2 q
(n;m) = m
n (  )  
n (m+ 1) (n  1) :
Consequently the equilibrium output price writes as
p(n;m) =
 (m  n) + n2 (m+ 1) mn (2  )
n (n  1) (m+ 1) (2)
We may now calculate the equilibrium input price ! as the ratio 
n
k=1bk
mh=1sh
;
1We require  < 1 to guarantie that the output price is always larger that the input prices when the basic economy
is replicated innitely.
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!(n;m) =
n (+ m)  
 (m+ 1)n
: (3)
Accordingly, the (n+m)-vector (b(S); ::; b(S); s; ::; s) constitutes the symmetric subgame perfect
equilibrium of the sequential game.
In order for this vector to be an equilibrium, it is also required that the values b(S) and s to
be both positive. These two inequalities are both simultaneously satised if and only if the condition
  n
(n  1)
holds. This condition coincides with the condition which guarantees that both upstream and down-
stream rms make positive prots. Notice that this condition is slightly stronger than the condition
required to be satised in the traditional model, which simply boils down to   : The reason for
this strengthening should be found in the indirect strategic power that downstream rms exert in the
upstream market : they inuence the amount of input sales via their money bids, and this inuence
fades away when the number n of downstream rms increases. In the traditional model, this inuence
does not exist since downstream rms take the input price as given when buying the input2.
3.2 Price-taking scenario
In this section, we shortly recall the example of successive oligopolies considered in the previous
literature. Consider the two successive markets described in section (3). Assume now that in the
downstream game, rms select strategically the output levels qi(!); which determines their individual
input demand zi(!) via the production function f; taking the input price as given. Consequently,
the downstream rms while behaving strategically in the nal good market, are assumed to be price
takers in the input market. The prots i(qi; q i) of the ith downstream rm at the vector of strategies
(qi; q i) is
i(qi; q i) = (1  qi   k 6=iqk)qi   pzi:
As a result of the strategic choice qi; each rm i sends an input quantity signal zi(!) =
qi
 to the
upstream market. Given the price ! in the input market, the best reply of downstream rm i in the
upstream game is zi(z i;!) =
 
  !   2k 6=izk

=22; i = 1; :::; n: We may compute the symmetric
Nash equilibrium of the above game contingent on the price !: Dening zi = z for i = 1:::n; we get
at the symmetric solution q = (  !) =(n + 1):Given a n-tuple (s1;:::; sj ; ::sm) of input strategies
chosen by the upstream rms in the second stage game, the input price clearing the upstream market
must satisfy nq = mk=1sk:So that, we get
!(mk=1sk) =   2
n+ 1
n
mk=1sk: (4)
Substituting (4) into the payo¤ function  j(sj ; s j) we have
 j(sj ; s j) =

  2n+ 1
n
mk=1sk

sj   sj :
Accordingly, using the rst order conditions, at the symmetric equilibrium of the second stage game,
we obtain
s(n;m) =
n (  )
2(n+ 1)(m+ 1)
: (5)
2A similar condition appears in another,but close, context (see Gabszewicz and Michel (1997)). These authors analyse
the oligopoly equilibrium of a market game with exchange and production.
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Finally, the equilibrium price in the input market is
!(n;m) =
m+ 
m+ 1
: (6)
Consequently, the equilibrium output quantities are
q(n;m) =
m(  )
 (n+ 1) (m+ 1)
;
while the resulting output price p(n;m) in the downstream market is
p(n;m) =
(1 +m+ n) + mn
 (n+ 1) (m+ 1)
(7)
This market solution is now compared with the market solution in the scenario with market games in
section (4).
4 Comparing the equilibrium outcomes
This section is dedicated to the comparison of equilibrium outcomes corresponding to the two scenarios
and it also includes a welfare analysis.
The two approaches - the price-taking approach and the market games approach, - mainly di¤er
according to how downstream rms total production costs are introduced in the model. In the
market mechanism approach, these costs depend on the input price and the quantity of input invested
in production. In the market game approach, total costs do not depend on the quantity of input
invested in the production, but reduces to a lump-sum amount corresponding to the bid o¤ered by the
downstream in exchange of its input share. Nothing prevents to deduce from it a notion of average
cost (and marginal cost in the case of constant returns) simply by dividing the bid by the number of
output units produced.
Using this notion, we show that
Proposition 1 The equilibrium input price under market games is higher than the corresponding
input price under the price-taking scenario if and only if n > =(1   )( + m); otherwise, the
reverse holds.
Proof. The sign of the di¤erence of (3) and (6) is the sign of n
 
+m  m   2  > 0; which
is positive if n > =(1  )(+ m):
Under market games, the markup of upstream rms shrinks because downstream rms bid to
obtain the input quantity desired rather than take the input price as given. This e¤ect has the same
avour as the softening of double marginalization due to vertical integration and it induces a decrease
in the input price. Vertical integration reduces the input price because the integrated entity produces
the input internally. As in the analysis of vertical integration, the extent of this e¤ect depends on the
number of rms in both markets. The higher the number of downstream rms and of upstream rms,
the lower the markup of each and thus the lower double marginalization. Proposition (1) identies
such a relationship between the number of upstream rms and downstream rms. The condition on n
corresponds in fact to the threshold number of downstream rms, below which double marginalization
with the classical approach is quite large. Therefore, as long as the number of rms in the downstream
market is lower than this threshold, market games cause a decrease in the input price.
By contrast, when the number of rms exceeds such a threshold, double marginalization is small.
But the number of rms that bid is large. Therefore, when n exceeds this threshold, the input demand
increases more than the elimination of double marginalization. As a consequence, the input price under
market games is higher than the corresponding price in the price-taking regime.
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Notice that the higher the number of upstream rms, the less binding the condition in Proposition
1 becomes. When m!1; upstream rms are price takers in the input market thus double marginal-
ization is null. Therefore, the only e¤ect introduced by the mechanism of market games is the market
power of downstream rm in the input market. As a consequence, the input price under market games
is always higher than the corresponding input price in the price-taking scenario.
Comparison of equilibrium output prices yields
Proposition 2 The output price of the market game scenario is always higher than the output price
corresponding to the price-taking regime.
Proof. From direct comparison of output prices, the sign of the di¤erence of (2) and (7) is the sign
of
 
+ n + n2 (  ) (n  2) ; which is positive since  >  and n  2:
When the input price under the market game regime is higher than the corresponding input price
in the classical approach (n > =(1  )(+ m)); also the output price with market game is higher
due to higher input costs.
Instead when the input price is lower under market games (n < =(1 )(+m)) two e¤ects on
the output price take place. The reduction of the input cost for each rm i leads to a direct advantage
for rm i and an indirect disadvantage all other rms  i. In fact, each downstream rm behavior has
a strategic e¤ect on its rival rms in the downstream market. According to Proposition 1 this occurs
when the downstream market is quite concentrated . Exactly because the number of downstream rms
is small, the indirect e¤ect is higher than the direct e¤ect, and thus, the output price with market
game is lower.
The comparison of equilibrium output prices gives interesting insights concerning the extent of
double marginalization. Double marginalization is dened as the sum of the markup exercised by the
upstream rms, !(m;n) ; and the markup applied by the downstream rms, p(m;n) !(m;n);
which yields p(m;n)   : Therefore, to compare double marginalization, it is enough to compare
output prices obtained with each scenario. Using Proposition 2, we can claim
Corollary 3 Double marginalization observed in the market game scenario exceeds the one arising at
the symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium in the classical approach.
This feature has relevant consequences for the e¤ects of vertical agreements. As it is known,
such contracts have from one side positive e¤ects on output prices because they eliminate double
marginalization. But on the other hand, they may have anti-competitive e¤ects due to possible
raising rivals cost strategies. The above proposition tells that with market games the positive e¤ect
of vertical integration has a larger size, as compared to the e¤ect obtained in the classical analysis.
Therefore, due to the above proposition, whenever downstream rms have market power in the output
and in the input market, vertical integration should arise more frequently in equilibrium because the
vertical externality eliminated by it is larger than the externality eliminated when downstream rms
are price takers in the input market.
Finally, we model free entry by replicating k-times the basic economy described above, as in Debreu
and Scarf (1963). In the kth replica, downstream market demand is given by k(1 Q) and there are
kn downstream and km upstream rms. Notice that, in the kth replica, the prices at which demand is
equal to supply both in the downstream and upstream markets, do not depend on the number k, but
depend only on m and n. Indeed, at the symmetric equilibrium in the upstream market, the input
quantities supplied by the m upstream rms have to be multiplied by k in the rth-replica; similarly
for the quantities demanded by the n downstream rms in the downstream market. Consequently, the
equality of supply and demand in the upstream market eliminates the k  factor in each side of the
equality. A similar reasoning applies for the symmetric price equilibrium in the downstream market.
8
It follows that the study of the behavior of the upstream and downstream markets when the number of
replications increases is equivalent to the study of the limit equilibrium prices and quantities obtained
in the previous section when the number of rms is kn and km instead of n and m in each market,
respectively. Such a replication yields the following result.
Proposition 4 When the basic economy is replicated innitely, the markup of downstream rms with
the price-taking scenario converges to the di¤erence of marginal costs    : Such a convergence does
not occur in market games scenario.
Proof. Taking the limit of the di¤erence of equilibrium prices in the price-taking scenario we obtain:
limk!1 (p(km; kn)  !(km; kn)) =    : If   1; this di¤erence is non-negative: The same limit
in the market game scenario is limk!1 (p(km; kn)  !(km; kn)) = 1    : This markup is positive
because  < : Then, simple manipulations lead to 1   >     ,  < 2  :
Two issues arise. Firstly, when both upstream and downstream markets are perfectly competitive
(n ! 1 and m ! 1) the series of markups of downstream rms does not converge towards the
di¤erence between the output and input marginal cost     under market games. Secondly, the
markup of downstream rms under market games can be lower or larger than the markup under the
classical approach. Such a di¤erence depends on the input marginal cost  and the marginal product of
the input :Whenever the marginal product in the downstream market  is substantially larger than
the marginal cost  in the upstream one, the markup is higher than   :While, when the ratio  is
closer to one, the reverse holds true. This phenomenon is similar to the one identied in Gabswewicz
and Zanaj (2011). In that case, when both markets become competitive and downstream rms use
a decreasing returns technology rather than a constant returns one, the markup of downstream rms
stays above the di¤erence of marginal costs. In this paper, even if both upstream and downstream
rms use constant returns technology, the convergence is not obtained. As in the case of decreasing
returns, the very large number of rms is not enough to assure the convergence towards marginal cost.
When markets are technologically-linked, at the limit economy, the prices adjust to values that make
the demand and the supply to equalize. When technologies have di¤erent marginal products, nothing
guarantees that the price would tend to the marginal cost, even though the prots of downstream and
upstream rms do tend to zero.
Welfare analysis Two types of ine¢ ciency can occur in a Cournot equilibrium as compared with
the equilibrium of a central planner: the equilibrium price exceeds the marginal cost of production,
and aggregate output is ine¢ ciently distributed over the rms. Our analysis assumes that rms
use the same technology, therefore our welfare analysis concentrates on how much the equilibrium
output price exceeds the marginal cost of production in the output market and in the input for each
scenario. Furthermore, the production costs in the downstream market are just a transfer from the
downstream to upstream rms for both scenarios considered, thus, the key ingredient to evaluate
welfare is the consumer surplus (in the downstream market). The output price that corresponds to
perfect competition is equal to the output marginal cost namely ! : Furthermore, the input price
corresponding to perfect competition in the upstream market is equal to the input marginal cost :
Hence, the output price ~p corresponding to the welfare maximizing conguration of the economy is
~p =  :
The measure of ine¢ ciency of the price-taking scenario in the output market is the di¤erence
between ~p and the equilibrium output price (7). Similarly, the measure of ine¢ ciency in the market
game scenario in the output market is the di¤erence between ~p and the equilibrium output price
(2). Since ~p does not depend on the number of rms in the upstream and downstream market, the
comparison of ine¢ ciencies of the two scenarios is obtained by the direct comparison of equilibrium
output prices (7) and (2).
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As far as it concerns the welfare consequences in the upstream market, we cannot use the compar-
ison of equilibrium input prices and marginal cost : The reason is that input demand is not the same
with market games and with price-taking downstream rm in the input market. Input demand is
endogenous in the model and obtains from the maximization of prot of downstream rms di¤erently
from the demand of the output that is exogenous. Hence, the only measure of welfare is the prot of
upstream rms. Direct comparison of output prices and prots of upstream rms yields:
Proposition 5 The allocation of resources achieved by a market economy under market games de-
creases welfare with respect to the allocation of a market economy with input price-taking downstream
rms whenever the downstream market is rather concentrated.
Proof. For the direct comparison of output prices see proof of Lemma 1. Comparison of input supplies
(1) and (5) says that the input supply with market game is lower than the input supply in the classical
scenario if  (n  1)  2n < 0 or n <  2 : Thus, using Proposition 1, the prot of an upstream rm
is lower with market games if n < min f=(1  )(+ m); =(  2)g :
When the downstream market is rather concentrated, downstream rms exert a high market power
in both markets. Consequently, with market games, welfare decreases. Instead, when the number of
downstream rms is large, their market power in the upstream market is diluted. Thus, the prot of
upstream rm is higher than its prot in the price-taking scenario. Since, the welfare in the downstream
market is always lower with market games, the e¤ect on welfare of market games is ambiguous.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we use the concept of Shapley-Shubik market game to describe the economic outcome of
the downstream and upstream rmsinteraction in successive oligopolies. Our exploration of industry
equilibria departs from the existing literature. In particular, it does not assume that downstream
rms behave as price-takers in the upstream market, an awkward assumption because, in several
industrial contexts, it is di¢ cult to justify the fact that an economic agent behaves strategically in
one market but not in the other. In the market game approach, all agents behave strategically.
Exploring the properties of equilibria in this new framework and comparing them with equilibrium
market outcomes in the traditional approach is the object of this paper. This comparison leads to
the following conclusions. First, double marginalization observed in the market game scenario exceeds
the one arising at the symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium in the classical approach. Second,
while innite replication of the basic economy drives the markup of downstream rms to the marginal
cost within the price taking scenario, such a convergence does not occur in the market games regime.
Finally, the resource allocation achieved by an economy operating as in market games decreases welfare
with respect to the allocation of an economy with input price-taking downstream rms whenever the
downstream market is rather concentrated.
Most probably there are other economic contexts in which the notion of market games could be
usefully utilized, even in a partial equilibrium framework, in particular in markets in which both sides
have market power, like industries for intermediate goods which are often characterized by the fact
that both sides consist of a small number of rms. This approach would then contrast with the usual
assumption according to which at least one side of the market behaves competitively. This would open
the door to capturing a new class of market situations which have been so far neglected due to the
lack of a natural theoretical framework in which these situations could be cast.
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